Independent Myanmar and Japan had long held the strongest ties among Asian countries, and they were often known as having "special relations" or a "historically friendly relationship." Such relations were guaranteed by the sentiments and experiences of the leaders of both countries. Among others, Ne Win, former strongman throughout the socialist period , was educated and trained by
Introduction
When the residence of Ne Win, former strongman throughout the socialist period, was surrounded by a military squad on March 4, 2002, he told his favorite daughter Sandar Win to call the Japanese ambassador in Yangon for help. Eventually, an alleged plot to overthrow the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 1 by Sandar Win's husband was uncovered. Ne Win was put under house arrest and died nine months later. At the last moment, when he stood on the brink of a precipice, Ne Win sought help from the Japanese government. The anecdote implies an extremely close relationship between the two parties.
In contrast, the SPDC reproached the Japanese government for its vote together with the United States, the United Kingdom and others in favor of putting Myanmar issues 2 on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)'s agenda on September 15, 2006. The Myanmar state-run newspaper furiously condemned the Japanese government by 1 The military took power in a coup in September 1988 and established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was re-constituted as the SPDC in November 1997. 2 Myanmar issues include the military government's violation of human rights, including the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, and a delay in democratization.
referring to human rights abuses by the Japanese army during the World War II. 3 So-called historical issues were rarely raised by the Ne Win regime. Even when the Japanese Ministry of Education issued revised guidelines for modern history textbooks in the 1980s, the Ne Win regime did not join China, South Korea and other Asian countries in criticizing the guidelines for whitewashing Japan's wartime outrages in Asian countries (Seekins [1992:254] ). The bilateral relations between Myanmar and Japan seem to have currently reached an all-time low for the last five decades.
Furthermore, not only political and diplomatic relations but also economic ties have become relatively weaker since 1988.
The birth of the military government in Myanmar and the Japanese response to it apparently marked a watershed in their relations. Japan was then believed to be the only country that possessed sufficient meaningful influence on Myanmar to encourage a move toward national reconciliation between the newly-born military government and the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. However, Japan failed to exert such an influence successfully on either side due to its reduced leverage in a new political and economic reality. Why and how have the close friends, Myanmar and Japan, become estranged? This paper examines factors that have contributed to putting them at a distance since 1988.
The first section reviews the history of relations between the two countries in the post-World War II period with special reference to Japan's official development assistance (ODA) provided to Myanmar. The provision of Japanese ODA had cemented the close ties between Ne Win and the Japanese government throughout the socialist period. The second section reviews the new international and regional reality surrounding Myanmar. The Cold War ended almost at the same time as the military government took power in Myanmar. The birth of the military government itself perhaps simply coincided with the end of the Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War brought about a new international and regional reality, and events that eventually put Myanmar and Japan at a distance occurred in this new environment. The third section examines four events and/or factors that resulted in an estrangement of the relationship between the two countries. The four events include changes in Japanese ODA policy, Myanmar's open-door policy and the attendant regionalization of trade, China's rise as an economic partner and increased revenues from natural gas extraction.
In conclusion, the author envisages a prospect of the relationship between the two countries in the future, and deliberates on a new role for Japan in international society, which would promote national reconciliation and economic development in Myanmar.
The Era of Close Friends
Myanmar and Japan had long held strong ties in the post-World War II period, and they were often known as having a "special relationship" or a "historically friendly relationship." 4 Such a relationship was established through the personal experiences and sentiments of Ne Win and others in the military and political elite of independent Myanmar. Aung San, Ne Win and other leaders of Myanmar's independence movement were members of the "Thirty Comrades," who were educated and trained by Japanese army officers. 5 The personal ties between national leaders of Myanmar and Japanese army officers were certainly instrumental in the formation of favorable bilateral relations between the two countries, in particular during the Ne Win era . Throughout the critical economic periods following the military coup of 1962, only the Japanese ambassador out of the whole diplomatic corps had continuous access to Ne Win (Steinberg [1990:57] ; Nemoto [2007:103] ). In addition to the "Thirty Comrades," many ministers and higher-ranking government officials in the Ne Win regime were also educated by Japanese army officers and civilians, and spoke Japanese to varying degrees. For example, Sein Lwin, who succeeded Ne Win in July 1988 and took the office of president for only 17 days, also spoke Japanese to a fair degree.
On the Japanese side, there was what had been informally called a "Burmese lobby"
in Tokyo (Steinberg [1990:59] In reality, huge ODA provided by the Japanese government to Myanmar cemented this special relationship, which was based on the personal sentiments of political elites in the two countries. ODA played a leading role in both economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Japan's aid, especially ODA yen loans, contributed most to this rapid increase. Table 2 shows the provision of yen loans to Myanmar. In the midst of the Cold War, the Ne Win government had long pursued a strict neutralist foreign policy, and refused to ally itself with any bloc. 10 The United States was of course unhappy about Ne Win's xenophobic policy. However, his visit to Washington in September 1966, presumably to counterbalance his trips to Beijing and Moscow in the previous year, improved their relations (Liang [1990:164] ).
Myanmar had never been a major object of the United States' attention since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1948 (Liang [1990:233] ). Nevertheless, the United States government regarded the nationalist Myanmar armed forces led by Ne Win as a countervailing power against Communist 8 Myanmar's ranking in Japan's ODA recipients is as follows: 9 th in 1976, below 10 th in 1977, 4 th in 1978, 1979 and 1980, 6 th in 1981, 1982 and 1983, 7 th in 1984, 5 th in 1985 and 1986, 8 th in 1987 and 7 th in 1988. 9 It is an anomaly that such a huge amount of Japanese ODA was provided to an underdeveloped economy with little Japanese commercial interests. There are several reasons for this besides the "special relationship." See Steinberg [1990] , Seekins [1992] and Kudo [1998j] for these reasons. 10 See Liang [1990] and Sakuma [1993] for Myanmar's foreign policy after independence.
China. 11 Such recognition by the United States was then enough for Japan, West Germany and international development banks to support the Ne Win regime on behalf of the Western bloc. The United States had tolerated the Ne Win government, as it had many other authoritarian, repressive and corrupt regimes, simply because the leaders of those regimes were willing to oppose the Communist allies.
However, the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the international and regional political landscape surrounding Myanmar just as the military government was coming into power. First of all, the United States ceased to prop up allied authoritarian governments in order to spur on democratization in less developed countries (Cingranelli and Richards [1999:513] ). In 1992 Japan also adopted the ODA Charter, which placed a greater emphasis on universal values of human rights and democracy.
Second, China relented on its dual-track foreign policy toward Myanmar, in which it had formerly endorsed party-to-party relations between the China Communist Party (CCP) and the Burma Communist Party (BCP) in addition to state-to-state relations (Kudo [2006:5] ). The BCP, which was deployed alongside the border areas between Myanmar and China, had long fought against the Myanmar army since independence.
However, having lost Beijing's backing, the BCP collapsed and split into four ethnic armed groups in 1989. Khin Nyunt, then Secretary One of the SLORC, wasted no time in going to the Chinese border, successfully achieving a ceasefire with these groups. 12 This event paved the way for a later strengthening of political and economic relations between Yangon and Beijing.
Third, Thailand also strengthened its ties with the newly-born military government, by abandoning its secret strategy of using the Karen and other ethnic insurgents deployed alongside the border areas as a buffer against the Myanmar army and the BCP.
Just before the end of the Cold War, Chatichai Choonhavan, then Thai Prime Minister, stated before the Foreign Correspondents' Club in December 1988 that Indochina must be transformed from a war-zone to a peace-zone linked with Southeast Asia through trade ties, investment, and modern communications (Buszynski [1989 (Buszynski [ :1059 ). "Change the battle field to a commercial field" had become a Thai vision for regional cooperation in mainland Indochina. Thus, two big neighbors, China and Thailand, welcomed the 11 China also regarded the Myanmar armed forces as anti-Communist (Sakuma [1993:185] ). 12 See Lintner [1990] , [1994] and [1998] and Smith [2005] for details. (Cingranelli and Richards [1999:515] ).
How Close Friends Become Estranged
The new international and regional reality following the end of the Cold War was responsible for such events as changes in Japan's ODA policy, Myanmar's open-door policy, strengthened economic ties with its neighbors and China's emergence as an economic partner. All of these events, however, eventually impaired the special relationship between Myanmar and Japan. How did these events cause the estrangement of these two close friends?
(1) Changes in Japan's ODA Policy The suspension of Japanese ODA to Myanmar was one of the earliest applications of the ODA Charter. Japan suspended the ODA provision to Myanmar of its own accord based on the new policy. The newly-born military government, which was ignorant of such a policy shift on the Japanese side, must have hardly comprehended in their early days why Japan would not resume aid to Myanmar. 15 In fact, so far as human rights conditions in Myanmar were concerned, the actual situation may not have significantly deteriorated following the military coup, although this is perhaps arguable. The military's atrocities against the minority insurgencies were even more dreadful before the SLORC initiated the ethnic ceasefire policy in 1989. 16 Recently, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has coined some new slogans, namely, "value-oriented diplomacy" and "the arc of freedom and prosperity," by which Japanese diplomacy has put even more emphasis on universal values, including human rights and democracy. 17 Thus, the "special relationship" between Myanmar and Japan was replaced by a more basic principle based on universal values. 19 As bilateral trade relations have weakened, the number of Japanese-affiliated firms in Myanmar has also declined. The membership of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Yangon has decreased from about 80-90 firms in the latter half of the 1990s to less than 60 firms as of August 2007. 20 China does not disclose its economic cooperation programs. The information here is based on news and press reports. Note also that some Chinese economic cooperation programs are merely commercial-based businesses. See Kudo [2006:12-17 ] for more on Chinese economic cooperation in Myanmar. What prospects can we then envisage for a future relationship between Myanmar and Japan? Unfortunately, there is little expectation that the military government will change their authoritarian attitudes in favor of a more democratic polity and more respect for human rights and political freedom. Unless the military government changes, Japan's foreign policy toward Myanmar will not change, either. The bilateral relationship between the two countries, therefore, may not dramatically improve in the foreseeable future.
Worse still, Japan seems to be losing its influence on Myanmar issues in international society, as it has occupied a vague position between the sanctionist allies such as the United States and the European Union and the constructive and economic engagement allies such as China, India and Thailand. Japan tried to bridge the gap between them.
However, Japan was caught in the gap rather than filling it. Instead of acting as a mediator, the Japanese government sometimes wavered from one camp to the other.
For example, the Japanese government apparently objected to the United States and United Kingdom's motion to put the Myanmar/Burma issues on the UNSC's agenda by saying at the second UNSC's unofficial briefing on May 31, 2006 that Myanmar's situation will not pose a serious threat to international peace and security.
Nevertheless, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper Japan voted in favor of the motion less than four months later on September 15, 2006. Such a change in the Japanese attitude on the motion is believed to be attributable to United States pressure.
Under such circumstances, Japan will not be able to take a leading role in either the Western allies or the Eastern allies.
However, this does not mean there is no role for Japan in international society. On the contrary, Japan has its own important role to play, that is, to provide accurate information on Myanmar's politics, economy, society and history to international society.
The Japanese government, business circles and academics have accumulated knowledge on Myanmar studies since as early as the pre-World War period. Such knowledge will definitely contribute to a better understanding of Myanmar issues, and may moderate some extreme opinions and policies.
For example, the import ban of the United States against Myanmar appears to be an anomaly in my eyes. As discussed in my previous paper, the United States sanctions not only failed to change the behavior and attitudes of the military government, but also had a disproportionately greater impact on the people than it did on the military regime (Kudo [2005:25-26] ). On the other hand, the Chinese economic cooperation bailed the military government out of an economic predicament and allowed them to forgo economic reforms, which were necessary for a long-term and broad-based economic development of Myanmar. For instance, many of the SEEs were revived, rather than privatized, by Chinese economic cooperation funds (Kudo [2006:15-16] ).
Two extremes, that is, economic sanctions and economic cooperation without considering the governance of the recipient, promoted neither economic development nor national reconciliation. Japan can provide rich and objective knowledge to both extremes, and possibly moderate them. The role of Japan is therefore to function as an information source and to contribute to producing a moderate, constructive and consistent policy consensus on Myanmar issues in international society.
Last but not least, human, cultural, sports and academic exchanges should be continuously encouraged, even though the relationship between the governments is not particularly smooth. The Myanmar people are still very friendly to the Japanese. The Japanese language is one of the most popular languages for Myanmar people to learn. Japanese products from Toyota cars to TV dramas are well favored by Myanmar consumers. Such friendship between the populations is a precious asset for the two countries, in particular Japan. 
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